By Paul Emanuelli

The risks of collusion and conflicts in public sector procurement have been well-documented. These risks range from criminal and quasi-criminal offences such as influence peddling, bribery, bid-rigging and fraudulent transactions to illegal and unethical practices, including the improper lobbying of elected officials to influence contract award decisions, and conflicts of interest involving elected officials, senior-level decision-makers, and bid evaluators. (see Collusion in Public Procurement)

This article will address recent case studies dealing with influence peddling, bribery, bid-rigging and fraud, while a follows-up article will address conflict of interest in public procurement. (see Conflict of Interest in Canadian Procurement)

Turning first to influence peddling, in its March 2018 decision in R. v. Carson, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the conviction of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada for the criminal offence of influence peddling. As the evidence showed, during the year following his departure from his position as senior advisor to the Prime Minister, Bruce Carson entered into an agreement with H2O, a water treatment company, to use his government contacts to promote the sale of the company’s water treatment systems to First Nations communities in exchange for commissions to be paid to his girlfriend. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that this type of lobbying to influence government contract spending decisions in exchange for a commission constituted a criminal offence under the relevant Criminal Code provisions. In this precedent setting decision, the Supreme Court of Canada took an expansive view of influence peddling, finding that the criminal offence extended beyond attempts to influence specific contract awards and included attempts to influence broader budgeting decisions made by public institutions to fund specific program areas involving contracting expenditures. Given the above Supreme Court precedent, public institutions should be wary of lobbyist who are working on a commission and attempting to influence their spending and contracting decisions. (see Former PM Advisor Convicted on Influence Peddling)

Collusion risks are not limited to elected officials, or their present or former advisors, but also extend to senior-level decision-makers within a public institution. These collusion risks include the subcategory of bribery. For example, in its July 2023 decision in Winnipeg (City) v. Caspian Projects Inc., the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of a former municipal chief administrative officer who was found liable for accepting bribes in relation to a major contract award for the construction of a new police headquarters and improperly influencing the award of that contract. As the Court noted, the act of bribery can attract both criminal and civil sanctions. In this case the City sought a civil remedy for financial compensation. (see Former Winnipeg CAO Liable for Bribery) Recent reports confirm that the former CAO repaid the City of Winnipeg $1.15 million in restitution due to the illegal activity. (see Former Winnipeg CAO Phil Sheegl follows through on order to pay city $1.15M for receiving police HQ bribe | CBC Accessibility) This case underscores the importance of establishing effective oversight and checks and balances within a public institution to remove the risk that any single individual can unduly and inappropriately influence, or be seen to be influencing, a major contracting decision.

Bid-rigging is another well-documented risk area in public procurement both within Canada and internationally. (see Global Bid-Rigging Pandemic) In fact, in 2009, Canada’s federal government enacted amendments to the Competition Act that targeted anti-competitive practices in the marketplace. The bid-rigging amendments were squarely directed at creating a greater deterrent against illegally manipulating the competitive bidding process. In fact, the new amendments significantly increased the penalties relating to bid-rigging, increasing the maximum term of imprisonment from five years to 14 years. (see Competition Act Changes Address Bid-Rigging Risks) However, notwithstanding these increased penalties, bid-rigging remains a persistent problem in Canada and results in a high volume of complaints, investigations and successful prosecutions each year. (see Competition Bureau Statistics)

Concerns over bid-rigging have also been raised in municipal public audit reports. For example, in its July 2021 report entitled Roads Value for Money Audit, Hamilton’s City Auditor found multiple warning signs of bidder collusion in road paving tenders, findings that were similar to those contained in the Toronto Auditor General’s March 2017 report entitled Detection of Warning Signs for Potential Bid Rigging Should be Strengthened. (see Weak Conflict Controls in Canadian Procurement)

Some bid-rigging and collusion schemes involve internal accomplices within the public institution. For example, in its September 2019 decision in R. v. Ross and Dawson, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court found that two government employees, along with a supplier operating under different company names, conspired to defraud the government through a long-running contact-splitting and bid-rigging scheme that artificially limited contract values to allow for invitational tendering where that single individual was the only one invited to submit multiple bids to fix bid awards for over $2 million in small contracts. (see Contract-Splitting Used in Bid-Rigging Scheme).

These issues are not limited to Canadian institutions. For example, in its April 2022 report entitled Misconduct within the Department of Communities relating to country building projects, Western Australia’s Corruption and Crime Commission found that weak oversight within the Department of Communities enabled a newly hired government employee to manipulate contract awards in exchange for contractor kickbacks in a scheme similar to that uncovered above at the Nova Scotia military base. (see Weak Oversight Enables Kickback Scheme) As with the above-noted Winnipeg bribery case, effective checks and balances need to be established within public institutions to guard against any individual being able to manipulate, or appearing to be able to manipulate, a contract award and spending decision.

In addition to bid-rigging and related collusion offences, the Competition Act also exposes public institutions to regulatory oversight in relation to restrictive contracting practices. For example, in its October 2019 decision in The Commissioner of Competition v Vancouver Airport Authority, Canada’s Competition Tribunal found that the Vancouver Airport Authority (VAA) did not breach competition rules when it limited the number of catering companies eligible to bid on airline catering contracts. The Tribunal found that the decision was made for the valid business reasons of maintaining two viable operators for competition, since opening competition to other operators for only part of the overall work (galley delivery but not catering) could undermine competition and disrupt service to airlines if an incumbent left the market due to the entry of another supplier. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the limitation of competition was justified based on legitimate operational requirements. As this case illustrates, contracting procedures that limit competition may be subject to anti-competition actions initiated by authorities responsible for enforcing general competition laws. To the extent that contract scoping decisions have the effect of limiting competition, purchasing institutions should ensure that those decisions are supportable based on legitimate operational requirements.

Collusion can also take the form of fraudulent billing when proper checks and balances are not established within an institution. For example, in an April 2009 report, Alberta’s Auditor General found that Bow Valley College lacked the appropriate checks and balances to guard against inappropriate contract approvals. According to the Auditor General, this lack of clear contract approval protocols contributed to the alleged misappropriation of $189,000 by a College director. The report called for the creation of stronger internal controls, along with ethical guidelines that included clear reporting protocols in instances where staff suspect spending irregularities. (see Lack of Approvals Leads to Misappropriations) More recently, in a March 2020 audit report Edmonton’s City Auditor found that two City employees colluded with an external contractor to submit $1.8 million in false invoices. As the report detailed, the perpetrators took advantage of weak internal controls to facilitate the false billing scheme since the City had no effective systems in place to check invoices for contracts that did not follow proper tendering procedures. (see Are You a Soft Target for Purchasing Scams)

In summary, public institutions need to bolster their internal governance practices to guard against these collusion risks in their procurement operations.

The themes in this article will be explored in greater detail in our new Fundamentals of Canadian Government Procurement certificate program that runs in April and returns in October. Please see our current training schedule for more details.