By Paul Emanuelli

This article is an excerpt from The Art of Tendering: A Global Due Diligence Guide.

The Ontario government’s $1 billion (CAD) eHealth scandal serves as a useful case study into the root causes of systemic mismanagement in government procurement. While much of the media attention focused on specific transactional irregularities, including the notable amount of inappropriate sole-sourcing of consulting contracts, the October 2009 Special Report: Ontario’s Electronic Health Records Initiative of the Auditor General of Ontario also noted a number of flaws in institutional governance that contributed to the mismanagement of public resources. These flaws should serve as early warning signs for other institutions that want to avoid similar spending scandals.

As the Auditor General aptly observed, “it has been said that shared accountability means no accountability.” It was within this context of “shared accountability” that the originating seeds of the eHealth scandal were sown. As the Auditor General noted, responsibility for the Ontario government’s overall electronic health records initiative was divided between the Ministry of Health’s eHealth’s Program Branch and the Smart Systems for Health Agency (SSHA). While SSHA was responsible for acquiring the technological infrastructure for the government’s health records information highway, the Ministry’s eHealth Branch retained responsibility for the overall stewardship and planning of the government initiative. As the Auditor General’s report found, the shared accountability structure resulted in dysfunction and in-fighting between the different government bodies:

By all accounts, it was not a true partnership and was marred by a lack of collegiality and confusion over each party’s respective roles and responsibilities. The Ministry and SSHA blamed each other for many of the failures and delays in system implementation. A telling example of how the Ministry was not working hand in hand with SSHA involves key SSHA employees leaving SSHA to work for the Ministry. Former SSHA executives advised us that they often faced operational problems as a result of employees moving to the Ministry to take consulting contract positions at significantly higher compensation levels.

The Auditor General also found that the creation of this inherently flawed governance structure, together with delays in recognizing the ongoing dysfunction within the program, significantly contributed to the eHealth problems:

The decision to have two entities at arm’s length from each other deliver the EHR solution—SSHA responsible for the underlying infrastructure and the Ministry’s eHealth Program Branch responsible for the overall EHR strategy and the related applications—was, in our opinion, inherently problematic. The success of this plan depended on both parties having a cohesive and co-operative working relationship. This was never the case. There was little co-ordination or co-operation between SSHA and the Ministry’s eHealth Program Branch. We were informed by numerous parties on both sides that the relationship was marred by mutual mistrust and confusion over roles and responsibilities. The dysfunctional relationship between the two entities and the evident discontent of the medical community should have “raised the red flag” sooner that something needed to be done.

The government eventually responded by spinning off the Ministry’s eHealth Branch and merging it with SSHA to form the new eHealth Ontario agency. However, as the Auditor General observed, the new eHealth Ontario agency failed to follow proper procurement practices as urgency became the justification for parting company with due process:

To sum up, too many procurements at the eHealth Ontario agency and, to a lesser extent, at the Ministry’s eHealth Program Branch and at SSHA were the product of rushed decision-making; the acceptance of expediency over thoroughness; the routine defence that the work was of an emergency nature and therefore justified the bypassing of normal procurement controls; procedural shortcuts; poor, absent, or contradictory documentation; and, of particular concern, the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a few individuals with no compensating controls to ensure their decisions were appropriate. Sound and reasonable policies were in place to ensure that all suppliers could fairly compete for government business and that tax dollars would be prudently spent, but all too often the rules were not followed.

The Auditor General found that these governance problems were compounded by the failure of the eHealth board to rein in a new CEO who “wielded considerable power to make unilateral decisions and essentially ignored procurement policies.” According to the report:

  • The board did not adequately oversee the CEO’s actions and decisions in this area. It appears to have accepted the CEO’s assertion that government and agency procurement policies were being followed, without getting sufficient details as to what that meant. For example, it never asked whether any contracts were sole-sourced and, if so, why, and what the value of such contracts was.
  • At the same time that a great deal of power was concentrated in the CEO’s hands, the agency was faced with the challenge of accelerating progress on the EHR initiative, considered by many to have suffered when it was managed by SSHA and the Ministry’s eHealth Program Branch. It was during this period, from October 2008 to June 2009, that millions were paid to consultants who had not been competitively procured. In other words, it was during this time of transition that the CEO and her executive management overrode the normal procurement and contract management controls that SSHA’s procurement department had in place. Our discussions with the CEO indicated that urgency and the implied authority she thought she had been given justified and warranted this.
  • The Chair told us that the Premier had personally asked him to chair the eHealth Ontario agency. He further informed us that he had told the Premier that his acceptance of the position was largely conditional on his being able to choose the CEO and the agency having the autonomy to act without significant government interference. We were advised that the Premier met with the Chair’s choice for the new CEO to impress upon her the importance of her upcoming work. Given that it had no input into the appointment of the CEO, and understanding that the Chair had personally chosen the CEO with the support of the Premier, the board may have had a perception that its oversight role with respect to the CEO was more limited than it would be in normal circumstances.

The Auditor General also cited the board’s handling of the new CEO’s mid-year bonus payment as further evidence of the board’s failure to adequately perform its oversight function due to the spectre of senior government involvement in the decision-making process:

The board’s approval of a performance bonus for the CEO midway through her first year on the job is an example of the extent to which the board may have felt it had little power to oversee matters relating to the CEO or question how she should be treated. There are two issues with respect to this bonus—the amount paid and the fact that it was awarded after only four months on the job.
The amount of the bonus paid to the CEO was $114,000, which was 30% of her salary. The maximum bonus rate under eHealth Ontario policy was 15%. However, the CEO had negotiated her 30% maximum bonus as one of the conditions of accepting the job, and it was included as part of her employment contract, approved by the Minister and authorized by an Order-in-Council. Although the bonus was significantly higher than what government Deputy Ministers can receive, we recognize that the government has to have some latitude with respect to executive compensation. The board therefore had no say with respect to the bonus available. It did have a responsibility, however, to assess whether the CEO’s performance justified the full 30% and whether the full bonus was warranted only four months into the job.

Under the shadow of government, the board failed to engage in its oversight role. The bonus was approved, and the procurement transgressions continued until the public scandal resulted in the dismissal of the several senior officials, including the CEO and the Minister of Health.

As the Auditor General’s report illustrates, systemic mismanagement created the perfect storm for the eHealth spending scandal. An inherently flawed governance structure based on blurred notions of “shared accountability,” coupled with the government’s delay in responding to the clear warning signs of bureaucratic dysfunction, caused the high-profile government initiative to run badly behind schedule. The dire situation was compounded by the midstream amalgamation of two dysfunctional government entities into a single agency. That new agency was born in the shadow of a looming crisis caused by ongoing delays in the highly complex, costly initiative. This lethal mix of urgency, complexity, and confusion was exacerbated by a board that failed to provide proper oversight as a newly appointed CEO made up for lost time by taking liberties with existing procurement protocols. Having exposed a profound lack of proper institutional governance, the eHealth scandal serves as a cautionary tale for all senior decision-makers who want to avoid similar outcomes within their own institutions.