This article is an excerpt from Government Procurement, which is available for purchase.
In its February 2014 decision in Pomerleau Inc. v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of the Department of Transportation and Works), the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court dismissed a lost profit claim brought by a rejected low bidder. The case involved a tender call for the construction of a Royal Newfoundland Constabulary building in St. John’s, Newfoundland. The low bidder, Pomerleau Inc., had its bid rejected as non-compliant. It challenged this rejection and claimed lost-profit damages on its $31 million bid after being denied the contract award.
The provincial government brought an application seeking a summary trial to defend the claim. The court agreed that a summary trial was appropriate since there were no issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the outstanding issues could be determined based on the documents before the court. The issue of bid compliance turned on the fact that Pomerleau had failed to complete a particular line item in the bid form relating to monthly elevator maintenance and service fees. That item was left blank in its $31,300,000 bid. The next-best bid, submitted by Olympic Construction Limited, included a completed bid form in the amount of $32,935,524.97. As the court noted, the omission in Pomerleau’s bid created significant concern within the government, resulting in the rejection of the low bid and the ensuing legal action:
19 Once the initial review was completed, the tenders were passed on to Mr. Paul Lahey, the department’s Design Manager for the project, to evaluate the bids for completeness, compare them to budget and make a recommendation to more senior departmental officials for contract award. Mr. Lahey noticed that the Pomerleau bid did not have a completed Appendix “D” attached. He discussed the matter with the Assistant Deputy Minister of the department and a direction was made to obtain a legal opinion on whether the bid was compliant. Ultimately, the issue was discussed among a number of senior officials of the department and even the Premier.
This ultimately resulted in the rejection of Pomerleau’s bid, the award to Olympic, and the resulting legal challenge.
While it acknowledged that it had inadvertently failed to fill out the bid form line item relating to elevator maintenance and service, Pomerleau argued that this represented the minor omission of a small item. Pomerleau maintained that the government should have corrected this minor error so that the contract award could go to Pomerleau as low bidder as required by statute:
22 Pomerleau acknowledged that it failed to complete Appendix “D” in the tender form due to inadvertence but submitted that that is not sufficient in the circumstances to justify the disqualification of its bid by the government. It submitted that this was a Stipulated Price Contract which was to be evaluated on the Total Tender Amount. It submitted that, while it had failed to fill in Appendix “D”, it had inserted the “Present Worth of Elevator Maintenance and Service Contract” amount in Appendix “C” as required which was included in its Total Tender Amount. Pomerleau submitted that its failure to complete Appendix “D” had no effect on the Total Tender Amount as it really related to a unit price for a small, subordinate part of the overall contract. In other words, it submitted that the omission was not a material part of the tender.
23 Pomerleau submitted that it would have been an easy thing for the government to have determined the monthly price of the elevator maintenance and servicing through a relatively simple mathematical exercise which it has been known to do in unit price contracts in the past. Pomerleau submitted that it was substantially compliant with the tender call which it submitted is the applicable standard and, as such, its bid ought not to have been disqualified.
24 Pomerleau submitted that the government was bound by the Public Tender Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-45 (the “Act”) to award the contract to the “preferred bidder”, defined in subsection 2(e) of the Act as the bidder submitting “the lowest qualified bid”. That bid, it submitted, was Pomerleau’s.
25 In the alternative, Pomerleau submitted that the government failed to act in utmost good faith and in accordance with the public policy objectives of the Act if in disqualifying its bid it relied on its discretion to reject “incorrectly prepared” bids in subsection 5(g) of the Instructions to Bidders.
The government disagreed with Pomerleau’s assertions. In its defence the government argued that the low bid was non-compliant and legally incapable of acceptance and that it did not have the legal discretion to waive the non-compliance. The court agreed with the government’s position, finding that the applicable compliance standard was strict compliance, rather than a more flexible substantial compliance standard, since the terms of the relevant tender call did not include a “discretion clause” permitting the government to waive minor irregularities:
33 In the case at bar, the tender documents did not include “a discretion clause” whereby the government could waive any irregularity or accept an incomplete tender. As stated in the Supreme Court of Canada cases referred to above, Contract A is governed by the terms of the tender documents. I therefore conclude that the standard to be applied in this case is strict compliance, not substantial compliance. This was a stipulated price contract with a unit price component. The government was entitled to set the terms of the tender provided it applied to all bidders fairly and did not give the government the opportunity to award the contract on an undisclosed preference.
The court therefore rejected the case law authorities relied on by Pomerleau to support the argument that a more flexible substantial compliance standard should have been used by the government to correct the omission in its bid:
43 The cases referred to by Pomerleau in which substantial compliance was the standard are distinguishable from the case at bar. In those cases, the tender documents contained a “discretion clause” allowing the owner to accept an incomplete bid or to waive an irregularity or the cases are peculiar to their own facts. The tender documents in this case do not contain a discretion clause and substantial compliance is not the test.
44 Pomerleau submitted an incomplete bid in clear breach of section 4(a) of the Instructions to Bidders. Pursuant to section 5(d) the government had no choice but to reject Pomerleau’s bid in order to be fair to Olympic which had filed a complete tender and was in full compliance with the tender call.
After finding in favour of the strict compliance standard, the court also found that the government was under no obligation to correct the pricing omission in Pomerleau’s bid:
34 The Elevator Maintenance and Services contract was a part of the tender call. I accept the evidence of Mr. Lahey that the monthly price required to be stated in Appendix “D” had two purposes. One was related to the award of the contract. For that purpose, the monthly price was used to calculate the present worth of the Elevator Maintenance and Service for 25 years in accordance with the formula set out in the specifications. As Mr. Lahey stated, “use of the present worth formula in Appendix “D” allowed for fair comparison of the bids.” The second purpose was related to the future costs of maintaining and servicing the elevators over the next 25 years. After the first five year period, the government would be able to obtain servicing tied to the annual inflation rate. It could also seek competitive quotes from other companies. The government needed the initial monthly cost for this purpose.
35 While the government did not have an updated tendering procedures manual in effect at the relevant time, there was a draft manual from 1998 put into evidence, many of the provisions of which were reflected in current government tendering practices. Although government practice allowed for the extension of a unit price if some simple mathematical error was made, neither Mr. Lahey nor any of the other witnesses could recall any instance where the government had employed a reverse calculation using the extended price to determine a missing unit price as Pomerleau submitted the government ought to have done. To have done so, the government would have had to assume that Pomerleau’s calculation of the extended price was correct. Without the information required in Appendix “D”, this was not possible.
36 The 1998 manual states in section 6.3.1 that a unit price left blank is a ground for rejection of a bid. In section 6.5 the manual states that “extensions are recalculated based on unit price; extensions must never be used to calculate a unit price.”
37 While the manual was not in force, I accept the evidence of Mr. Lahey that it was the practice of the government to not do such reverse calculations. There was no evidence to the contrary put before me. Nor am I prepared to find that any implied term of the contract required, or even permitted, the government to do so. To do so would have been a breach of the government’s Contract A with Olympic.
As the court stated, engaging in bid repair would have been contrary to the legal duty of fairness that the government owed to competing bidders under Contract A. The bid in question did not strictly comply with the bid requirements and was properly rejected. The court therefore summarily dismissed Pomerleau’s case.